Po2V: Network Layer Position Verification in Multi-Hopo Wireless Networks by Wu, Xizoxin & Nita-Rotaru, Cristina
Purdue University 
Purdue e-Pubs 
Department of Computer Science Technical 
Reports Department of Computer Science 
2005 




Purdue University, crisn@cs.purdue.edu 
Report Number: 
05-017 
Wu, Xizoxin and Nita-Rotaru, Cristina, "Po2V: Network Layer Position Verification in Multi-Hopo Wireless 
Networks" (2005). Department of Computer Science Technical Reports. Paper 1631. 
https://docs.lib.purdue.edu/cstech/1631 
This document has been made available through Purdue e-Pubs, a service of the Purdue University Libraries. 
Please contact epubs@purdue.edu for additional information. 
P02V: NETWORK LAYER POSITION VERICATION 
IN MULTI-HOP WIRELESS NETWORKS 
Xiaoxin Wu 
Cristina Nita-rotaru 
Department of Computer Sciences 
Purdue University 
Lafayette, IN 47907 





P O ~ V :  Network Layer Position Verification in 
Multi-Hop Wireless Networks 
Xiaoxin W u  and Cristina Nita-Rotaru 
Department of  Computer  Sciences 
Purdue University 
West  Lafayette: IN 47907 
Abstract-The correctness of the position is fundamental for 
position-based services. Previously proposed position verification 
schemes require an infrastructure, or the existence of a one-hop 
direct communication between the prover and the verifier. These 
schemes are less feasible in infrastructure-less networks where 
communication is achieved via multiple hops, such as mobile 
ad hoc networks. In this work we propose PO'V, a lightweight, 
network layer position verification scheme for distributed position 
services in mobile ad hoc networks, under which a position 
server can verify whether a user has reported a correct position. 
We use adaptive transmitting power and multi-path polling to 
improve verification accuracy. We study different attacks against 
the verification scheme and propose corresponding mitigation 
techniques. \I1e use a reputation system to reduce the false 
positives in a network with and without attackers. Our analysis 
and simulation studies show that while less expensive because 
no advanced techniques are required in the physical layer, 
PO'V can achieve a verification accuracy that suffices for many 
applications. 
Location-based services (LBS) [I]:  [Z] have become an 
important part of pervasive computing services. A LBS server 
uses the location of a user to determine whether the user should 
be served. Location or position information is also used in 
mobile ad hoc networks to facilitate routing. Position-based 
(or geographic) routing protocols [3] make decisions based on 
the geographical position of the destination of a packet, and 
therefore have better scalability and routing performance (e.g., 
delivery ratio, end-to-end delay) than traditional routing pro- 
tocols. In sensor networks, the location of a sensor determines 
whether the information collected by the sensor is useful, as 
the location indicates what area the sensor is monitoring. 
The correctness of position is essential for position-related 
services. For example. location-based access control allows 
a client to obtain access to a service based on location. A 
malicious user may claim to be within an area that gives 
him fraudulent access to a service. In the context of sensor 
networks, many sensor applications require the knowledge of 
the origin of the sensed information. A malicious participant 
can pretend to be at critical positions and provide misleading 
information. In addition. a false position in sensor networks 
facilitates attacks such as sensor displacenlent (a sensor is 
temporarily moved out of the network by an attacker with 
the goal to compron~ise itt but the sink will believe that the 
sensor is still in the network), wormhole attack (a sensor thinks 
a node far away from i t  is its neighbor) and false network 
topology (a base station makes wrong routing decisions based 
on false sensor positions). In ad hoc networks: as position- 
based routing relies on correct positions. a false position of 
the destination will result in a routing failure. Moreover. an 
attacker can make a neighbor to believe that the attacker is 
the closest to the destination and be selected on the routing 
path: by manipulating the position infonnation. As a result. the 
attacker will obtain control of significant traffic in the network. 
Finally. the correctness of the position information is essential 
for secure protocols that use position to prevent certain threats 
against network services [4], [5]. 
Position services can be classified in i1erwo1-k-ceilrric if 
the network obtains the position of the device directly. or 
device-ceilrric if the method of obtaining the position relies 
on a device (i.e. a mobile LBS user. an ad hoc node, or a 
sensor node). For example: in a network-centric approach. the 
position of a user is leanled based 011 the access point he 
is connected to or the base station he-obtains service from, 
since he must be within their coverage area. More accurate 
network-centric position obtaining approaches can be found 
in [6], [7]. In comparison, in a device-centric service, the 
position of a device is obtained by the device itself: e.g., 
according to the navigation signals from GPS [8] satellites or 
the beaconing signals from pre-deployed landmarkers [9]. The 
position is reported to so-called position servers, which store 
the positions. Other network users can retrieve the position 
information from the position server for different network 
functions. Device-centric position service systems have been 
proposed in mobile ad hoc networks in [I O]? [I I]. [I 21. [ I  31. 
An attacker can generate false position information and 
interrupt network-centric position-based services by disrupting 
the position calculation function. In the case of device-centric 
position-based services: an attacker can sin~ply report a false 
position or attack the navigation signal in GPS or the bea- 
coning signal in sensor networks, ensuring that the positions 
obtained by honest users are not correct. 
Position verification is a critical service. Its absence can 
result in numerous problems as discussed above. In the rest of 
the paper, we call the device of which the position needs to 
be verified a prover, and the parties that verify the position 
~*er i ' ers .  Previously proposed position verification schemes 
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co-operation among a number of verifiers is needed to deter- 
mine a false position report. Thus, they are less feasible in 
infrastructure-less networks, such as inobile ad hoc networks. 
In addition, as these schemes require one-hop connections 
between the prover and its verifiers, they cannot be applied 
directly in mobile ad hoc networks and sensor networks where 
the verifier can be several hops away from the prover. 
In this paper we focus on attacks where a user intentionally 
sends false position reports in a multi-hop wireless network. 
We propose p o 2 V ,  a lightweight, network layer polling based 
position verification scheme, that verifies the position informa- 
tion in a device-centric position-based service: in a multi-hop 
wireless network. Our scheme is less expensive because it does 
not use physical layer techniques [7] [I81 [19] [201 to verify 
the position. The trade-off is that Po2V has higher granularity 
and it can verify that a prover is within an area '. The size 
of the area is determined by the radio transmitting range for 
the polling message. Such a verification result is sufficient for 
many scenarios. Examples of such scenarios are: region-based 
access services, where a server must verify that a mobile user 
is within a region; sensor monitoring, where what is needed is 
to estimate the area where the sensor is located, therefore to 
estimate the monitoring range; ad hoc geocasting (211. [22]. 
where the region information of a destination is used to for 
routing. 
We present and evaluate the scheme in the context of a 
distributed position service system designed for inobile ad hoc 
networks. We summarize the major contributions of the paper 
as follows: 
. We design P O ~ V ,  a network layer position verification 
scheme. A testing message, named polling message, is 
sent by the verifier toward the prover to verify the tested 
position. . We evaluate the accuracy of the proposed scheme by 
both analysis and simulation. We propose as metrics the 
probability that a false reporter can be caught and the 
perturbation area that a false position can be located, to 
evaluate the accuracy. We also evaluate the fake  positive, 
where a legitimate position reporter is judged by mistake 
to be malicious. . We propose and analyze different enhanced algorithms 
that further improve the scheme. We adapt the transmit- 
ting power of the polling message to reduce the testing 
error. We propose multi-path detection and advanced 
physical layer techniques to further improve the accuracy. . We identify the potential attacks on the scheme and 
propose mitigating techniques. We address a so-called 
intersection attack and propose the triangle transmission 
through a third party to mitigate the attack. We analyze 
the attacks where a malicious party intentionally drops the 
polling message and propose a trusttreputation system to 
avoid blacklisting legitimate users. 
To the best of our knowledge, the only work 011 multi- 
'We note rhar physical layer techniques can be combined wirll Po'V in 
!he last hop of the polling message path. to improve verifi cation accuracy. 
hop position verification is 1231. A verifier finds a number of 
position proxies that are within a one-hop connection with the 
prover, through which the prover's position is verified. Po2\/' 
is more general, the approach in 1231 can be considered as a 
special case of our approach. 
The rest of the paper is 01-ganized as follows. In Section I1 
we present the related work. In Section 111; we introduce the 
concept of using polling for position verification, followed by 
Section IV where we pi-ovide a detailed description of po2\/. 
In Sections V, and VI: we anaIyze the accuracy for the position 
verification and show the major results of sinlulation study, 
respectively. In Section VI1, we conclude the work. 
A. Positioti Service Sj:sretn.s 
A11 example of network-centric position services is the 
E911 location system in a cellular network [6]: where the 
cellular network determines the position of a cellular user by 
measuring the distance between the cellular user and a number 
of base stations. Another example is the indoor location system 
presented in [7]. A snlall unit called BAT is attached to the 
inobile object. The location system is fine-grained, with a 
number of fixed stations allocated in different areas in an 
indoor environment. Each time the fixed stations transmit a 
radio message containing a single identifier, causing the cor- 
respondent BAT to reply with a short pulse of ultrasound. The 
location system calculates the position of the BAT using the 
method of multilateration: according to the distance between 
the BAT and different fixed stations. 
In a device-centric position service, the server can be a 
centralized entity, such as the base station in a sensor network 
or the cellular network in a cellular-assisted ad hoc network 
[31]. Servers can aJso be distributed, such as those in the 
typical works including Grid Location Service (GLS) [lo],  
Distributed Location Management (DLM) (DLM) [ I  I], and 
Virtual Home Region (VHR) based systems [ 121, [1 31. 
In GLS? the area covered by the entire network is divided 
into an hierarchy of grids with squares of increasing size. 
In each level of the grids. a node assigns an equal number 
of position servers. These servers have the closest identifier 
distance to this node's identifier. coinpared with all the other 
ad hoc nodes in the same grid. Once a node needs the position 
information of another node. among all the nodes for whom 
it has the position information, it selects the node whose 
identifier is the closest to the target node and forwards the 
request. As in GLS. in DLM, the area covered by the network 
is divided into an hierarchy of grids. Unlike in GLS: in DLM, 
for each node, its position servers are decided by whether the 
nodes reside in a certain area. The positions of those grids 
are the hashed result from the node's identifier, so that any 
other node who needs this node's position knows to which 
grid it should forward the position request to. The VHR- 
based position service system [13], [12], does not require the 
knowledge of grid hierarchy. Each node has a virtual home 
region (VHR) which is a geographical region around a fixed 






























































server located in a node's VHR will store the updated position 
of this node and respond to other nodes who request this 
position. The relationship between a node identifier and its 
VHR center is given by a hash function. This function is 
predefined and known by all the nodes who join the network. 
so that other nodes can acquire a node's position by sending 
position requests to the corresponding VHR. 
B. Position Obmilli~lg Techjliqlres 111 Device-Ce11r1-ic Posiriorl 
Services 
A device can obtain its absolute position according to 
the distance to some reference points of which the absolute 
positions are known. The measure of the distance between a 
device and the reference points can be either range-based or 
range-free. 
Range-based approaches use absolute point-to-point dis- 
tance or angle information between the device and reference 
points to calculate the locations through ~nultilateration. Com- 
mon techniques for distancelangle estimation including Time 
of Arrival (TOA) [8], Time Difference of Arrival (TDOA) 
[I 8][7] [19], Angle of Arrival (AOA) [20]: and Received 
Signal Strength (RSS) [I 81. The well known GPS [8] system 
is a range-based system. where TOA is used for a GPS user to 
calculate its distance to a number of satellites, and therefore 
to obtain its own position. The range-based approaches result 
in accurate positions. yet the cost on hardware for radio. 
sound, or video signals is high. In addition, such approaches 
require strict time synchronization. These make the approach 
not suitable for the network built up by low-cost devices, such 
as sensor networks; or for dynamic networks, such as mobile 
ad hoc networks. 
On the other hand, in range-free approaches, the position of 
an object is estimated by the connectivity between the object 
and the reference points. The exact distance or angle is not 
required. 111 [24], an approximate point in triangle (APIT) 
test algorithm is proposed. APIT resolves the localization 
problem by isolating the environment into triangular regions 
between anchor nodes. A node uses the point-in-triangle test to 
determine its relative location with triangles formed by anchors 
and thus narrows down the area in which it probably resides. 
APIT defines the center of gravity of the intersection of all 
triangles that a node resides in as the estimated node location. 
Other simple range-free algorithms can be found in [9] [25]: 
under which location is calct~lated by finding the centroid 
of its proximate anchor nodes. The range-free approaches 
have less accurate results, yet the errors can be masked by 
fault-tolerance of the network, redundancy computation, and 
aggregation. 
Range-free approaches have been extended so that an object 
can estimate its position even if it is multiple-hops away 
from reference nodes. Typical approaches [26], [27], [28] 
are proposed for sensor networks. In all these approaches, a 
position estimation is processed in three steps. In step I : sensor 
nodes detect the local connectivity, i.e., find the other nodes 
that are within one hop from themselves, and then estimate the 
distance from themselves to the reference points, i.e., anchor 
node(s). based on the hop counts. In [26], the distance is 
obtained by accumulating the range for each hop. To address 
the problem that in a network the llop range depends on 
network topology. in [27] the range for a hop is obtained 
by tinding out the average geographic distance for a hop 
in the multi-hop connections between anchor nodes. As the 
average hop range approach does not address the inaccuracy 
problem in highly irregular network topologies, in [28]. a so- 
called Euclidian method is proposed, through which the local 
geometry of the nodes around an anchor can be deducted. 
Based on the information obtained from step I .  in step 2: the 
position of a node can be calculated through multilateration. 
However. as such a result may not be as accurate as that in the 
single-hop approach due to the error for the distance between 
the object and the anchor nodes, in multi-hop approaches, a 
refinement is needed in step 3. Such a procedure is iterative, 
until the positions are converged to a relatively stable value. A 
similar multi-hop position estimation approach that is designed 
for ad hoc networks is presented in [32]. where the relative 
positions are estimated. 
Unlike the multi-hop range-free approaches which rely on 
the hop count of the shortest path, making them highly vulner- 
able to different attacks on routing [29], [30], our scheme relies 
only on the polling message delivery and has no requirement 
for what path should be used. Therefore, diverse routes can 
be used to improve both the robustness against attacks and the 
verification accuracy. 
C. Secure Posiriorl Sysre~ns 
Attacks can be conducted on beaconing signals sent from 
the reference points to either interfere with the signal or 
spoof the signal: so that an object can not derive its position 
correctly. Such an attack on the GPS navigation signal has 
been presented in [33]. Software changes in GPS receivers 
can mitigate some simple spoofing attacks [34]. For more 
sophisticated attacks, such as the so-called selective delay 
attack. an asymmetric security mechanism [33] can be used. 
~uthent icat ion for the beaconing signal in sensor networks 
can be found in [35]. In [35], a Secure Range-independent 
Localization (SeRLoc) scheme based on a two tier network 
architecture that achieves decentralized passive localization, is 
proposed. A symmetric key approach is used to authenticate 
the source of the beaconing signal. In addition, each reference 
point is equipped with directional antennas, covering different 
sector areas with different transmissions. A sensor detects 
the beacon signals from different reference points, computes 
the overlapping region of these beacon signals' coverage, 
and determines its location as the center of gravity of the 
overlapping region. The use of directional antenna improves 
the system robustness. A similar approach can be found in 
[361. 
Another approach to defend against the attack on the 
beaconing siznal is to use redundant beaconing information. 
A typical work is present in [37]: where the redundancy at 
different levels in a wireless network is explored to tolerate: 





















































proposed to make localization based on minimum mean square 
estimation (MMSE) less affected by different attacks. 
The malicious beaconing detection is studied in [38] and 
1391. In 1381: a method is proposed to filter the malicious 
beacon signals on the basis of consistency among multiple 
signals. In addition, a scheme has been designed to tolerate 
the ~nalicious beacon signal by adopting an iteratively refined 
voting scheme. In [39], a detecting node is used to discover 
the malicious beacon nodes. In particular. a round transmission 
time PDF function is used to filter out the malicious beacons. 
Other than protecting beaconing signals, in [40]: the knowl- 
edge of sensor deployment is used for a sensor to verify 
the position derived by itself. The main idea is that if a 
sensor is located at a position, it should have an expected 
neighborhood with sensors from different groups that have 
predictable geographic distributions. 
In [I51 Verifiable Multilateration (VM) is proposed. a tech- 
nique that enables secure computation and verification of the 
positions of wireless nodes in the presence of attackers. A 
number of reference points independently perform distance 
bounding to the verified wireless device. A centralized au- 
thority estimates the device's position based on the known 
positions of the verifiers and the distance bounds. VM prevents 
dishonest nodes from lying about their positions because of the 
property of distance bounding, that neither an attacker nor a 
prover can reduce the measured distance of the prover to the 
verifier, but only enlarge it. In 1141: an echo mechanism is used 
to verify whether a wireless device is within a region. This is 
a rough verification that only determines whether a prover is 
within an area. [l6],  [I71 show different ways of verifying the 
location of the satellite user. The network uses satellite ranges 
to estimate where its users are IocPted. 
This section presents how the polling method can be applied 
to verify the position of a prover in a distributed position 
service system in mobile ad hoc networks. We also list the 
attacks that may undermine the polling-based verification 
scheme and list the cases of false positives. 
A. Network atid Security Assutnptiotis 
We assume that ad hoc nodes are uniformly distributed in a 
specific area. A number of mobile servers are also distributed 
in the network. Each node has a virtual home region (VHR), 
which can be a circular area and the center of the area uniquely 
matches the node's identifier. Servers that are located within 
a node's VHR provide position services regarding to that 
node, such as position information storage, position update. 
and position retrieving. Distcrtice-bcrsed position update is 
processed, under which an ad hoc node updates its positions 
to the servers in its VHR only when the distance between 
its current position and the position in its previous report is 
more than a threshold value. Other nodes obtain this node's 
position by contacting the servers. A server can be located in 
a number of VHRs and serve a number of nodes. Neighboring 
nodes exchange their position information. Therefore, a node 
knows the position of its one-hop neighbors. The Greedy 
Positioning Routing protocol (GPSR) [42], is used for position 
management messaze delivery. 
We assume that there is an offline certificate authority that 
can assign public keys to the servers and ad hoc nodes. Servers 
are trusted and cannot be compromised. The communication 
between a server and its served ad hoc node as well as the 
communication between the servers is protected against eaves- 
dropping, impersonation, modification, replay and injection 
attacks, as in [43]. In addition: a position reporter cannot 
repudiate its reports. We assume that n~alicious nodes are 
colludin_g and have advanced communication channels that 
allow them to share information. 
A basic approach for the servers to verify whether a position 
reported by a node is correct, is to send a message toward 
the reported position. Upon receiving a position update, the 
server replies to the sender with an acknowledgnient. The 
acknowledgment will be routed to the sender via position- 
based routing using the reported position. A random number, 
referred as a t~orrlzce, is also included in the acknowledgment. 
The server accepts the position in the previous position update 
if the nounce is included in the following position update. 
Since the acknowledgment is sent immediately after the server 
receives the position update, it is unlikely that the tested node 
can not receive it due to a broken route between the server 
and itself. The only reason that the tested node cannot obtain 
the nounce is that it reported a false position, and based on 
this position, the acknowledgnient cannot be delivered to it. 
The server who first receives the updated message generates 
the nounce and distributes it with the updated position to 
other servers in the tested node's VHR, using the secure 
communication channel shared by all servers. In this case, if 
another server receives the following position update from the 
tested node, this server can also verify the previously reported 
position. The verification result is then distributed within the 
VHR along with the updated position. 
When a server sends the acknowledgment toward the up- 
dated position, it must include the destination position in 
the plain text, which is necessary for position-based routing. 
Therefore, the node's position is always disclosed to a number 
of nodes that are close to the route for the acluiowledgment 
delivery. This may not result in a direct position information 
exposure for the tested node. As the tested node can determine 
whether the testing message is destined for itself according to 
whether the position carried in the message is the position in 
its previous update, its identity does not need to be included in 
the polling message. However, sending an acknowledgment for 
every position update may lead to a match between the tested 
position and a node ID according to the moving trajectory 
of the tested node. In addition, sending a position acknowl- 
edgment upon every position update generates a significant 
overhead, unnecessary when most nodes are honest and report 
correct positions. 
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To address the problem. instead of sending an acknowl- 
edgment upon evely position update message: the server can 
send i t  after a number of position updates. A testing nounce 
is included in the acknowledgment. We refer to this scheme 
as a polling scheme and to the acknowledgment as a polling 
message. The node who has been polled has to include the 
testing nounce in its next position update. 
The polling scheme may work jointly with the existing po- 
sition verification schemes that use physical layer techniques. 
A server may use these technique to verify the positions of the 
nodes that are within one hop of it. possibly by cooperating 
with other servers. If the nodes are more than one hop away, 
the server uses polling for position verification. Such a position 
verification scheme is illustrated in Fig. I .  
Tile [es~ed node i s  one hop a w a y  
Fig. 1 .  A Polling-based Position Vzrifi cation Scheme. 
When using the above basic polling scheme to verify a 
node's position, a n~alicious node is able to take advantage 
of the verification scheme and report a false position without 
being caught. We classify this type of attack as deceiving 
posirio17 reporr orrock. On the other hand, malicious nodes 
can attack the polling messages. An honest position reporter 
therefore may not be able to receive the polling message and 
be mistakenly judged as malicious. We refer to this type of 
attack as a blacklisri~lg orrock. 
I )  Deceiving Position Report: 
If a malicious node knows when the server will send a 
polling message (e.g.: when server uses periodic polling), it 
can report the right positions at the time the server polls, 
and report false positions otherwise. Figure 2 shows a simple 
example. A server polls a tested node once every 3 position 
updates. A malicious node, who never moves, may claim its 
trajectory as shown in the figure. After the node reports its 
real position L I ,  it can claim it is at positions L2 and L3 in 
its next two reports. These locations are d, away, where d, 
is the distance threshold value based on which a node has to 
update its positions. After that it reports its real position again, 
which is L1. In this case, it can report a large number of false 
positions without being caught. 
Another attack, which we refer to as i~irersecrio~i arrack, 
takes place when nialicious node can report a false position 
that is on the extended line from its VHR to itself yet still 
receive the polling message. As shown in Fig. 3: the malicious 
node at position A claims that it is at position B. When a 
LI,  LA 
Fig. 2. Exanlple of false positio~~ report 
server located in a VHR sends a polling message toward B, 
the malicious node can intercept the message and successfully 
send a false position without being caught. An extreme case 
of an intersection attack occurs when the lnaIicious node stays 
within its VHR. If the size of VHR is not large: the malicious 
node can report a false position anywhere and intercept most 
of the verification messages sent from the servers. The inter- 
section attack can severely interrupt the functionality of the 
position service system because a node can claim a position 
that is far away from its real position. If there are colluded 
nodes, a malicious node can mislead the position system by 
staying close to the ser\lers of its partners and intercepting all 
the polling for them. 
B Fig. 3. Example of interception at~ack 
In both of the above attacks, a false position can be relatively 
far away from the real position. However, a malicious node 
can also take advantage of the in-accuracy of the polling 
verification method and claim false positions that are not very 
far away from its real position. 
2) Blacklisting Honest Nodes: 
In a polling-based verification scheme, the only trusted 
parties are the position servers and the routing for the polling 
messages relies on un-trusted intermediate forwarding nodes. 
Therefore, the scheme is prone to attacks against the multi- 
hop ad hoc connections between the verifiers and provers. 
Malicious nodes can interrupt the communication between a 
verifier and a prover so that once a polling message was sent 
out, the prover cannot receive it even if it has reported correct 
positions. As a result, the verifier will mistakenly judge an 
honest node to be n~alicious. 
Traditional attacks in ad hoc routing, such as jamming, 
packet dropping, packet modification, fabrication or replay, 
and denial of service (DoS), can be conducted to attack the 
polling message. In addition, as position-based routing is used 
for polling message delivery, the scheme can be attacked by 
modifying the routing inforn~ation, which is the position of the 
tested node. A node may also send out false positions during 
neighboring position exchanges. A malicious node can claim a 
position that is the closest to the destination so that a previous 
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hop may select it as the next hop. Once the polling message is 
sent to it based on the false position information, the malicious 
node can conduct further attacks such as packet dropping and 
manipulation. Attackers can also jam the area around a tested 
node or VHR, to cause DoS. 
D. False Positives 
A false positive in a polling verification occurs when an 
honest user who has sent a correct updated position cannot 
reply to the polling message. not due to attacks, but due to 
failures of the poling mechanisms itself. False positives make 
the server incorrectly conclude that the tested node provided 
a false position information, and diagnose it as a malicious 
node. 
For example. a false positive occurs if an honest user does 
not receive the polling message, because the route between 
the server and the tested node does not exist. This is possible 
especially when the polling message does not follow the 
reverse route of a position update. A tested node may not 
be able to receive the polling message also due to its own 
mobility. This may happen if the network is heavily loaded, 
and the delay for the polling message delivery is large. If the 
tested node is highly mobile. when the polling message arrives, 
the node may have already moved far away from its reported 
position and therefore cannot receive the polling message. 
Another cause for false positives is due to the fact that radio 
propagation is hard to predict, and the estimated transmitting 
power based on positions may not be accurate enough. When 
using adaptive transmitting power for polling message trans- 
n~ission (as in IV-A.3.a): the transmitting power calculated 
based on the ideal channel propagation model may not gen- 
erate the desired transn~ission range. A legitimate user who is 
located at its previously reported position thus may not receive 
the polling message. 
Finally, although i t  has received the polling message suc- 
cessfully, a tested node fails sending the next position update 
because the route between itself and the server(s) at that time 
does not exist anymore. 
IV. P o 2 V :  POLLING-BASED POSITION VERIFICATION 
SCHEME 
We propose P o 2 V :  a polling-based position verification 
scheme, under which a server (verifier) verifies the position 
reported by a tested node (prover) by sending a polling test 
inessage toward the reported position. A polling message 
carries the tested position in the plain text, and the nounce 
encrypted by the key shared between the server and the tested 
node. GPSR is used for polling message delivery. For the 
polling message delivery, each of the forwarders selects the 
neighbor that is the closest to the tested position as its next 
hop. Once the polling message reaches a node that is close 
enough to the tested position, i.e.> the distance between this 
node and the tested point is no more than the ad hoc radio 
transmission range, this node becomes the last hop for the 
polling message delivery. The last hop broadcasts the polling 
message. If the prover has reported a correct position, it should 
be able to receive the message and return the nounce to the 
server. 
In this section we provided a detailed description of Po2V 
that applies techniques to reduce false positives and mitigate 
the attacks previously described. 
A. Defetldit~g Agrritlst Deceivitlg Positiotl Reports 
I )  Random Polling: 
A tested node has to be polled randomly because a periodic 
polling gives a malicious node the opportunity to lie about 
its position without being caught. When the tested node is 
polled randomly, it is difficult for the ~nalicious node to predict 
when its position will be verified. Therefore, there is a high 
probability that a false report is discovered. 
2) Triangle Verifi cation: 
A solution to defend against the interception attack is to 
mask the polling message such that the attacker does not know 
that the position it reported is tested. For example, the tested 
position carried in the polling message is not the exact position 
that is carried in its last position update. but a position close 
by. However, the attacker can still receive the rnessage if it 
checks all the messages sent to the positions close to the false 
position it  reported. 
Another approach to defend against the interception attack 
is that when a tested node replies to the polling message, 
it includes the position of its previous hop from whom it 
receives the polling message. The previous hop signs its 
position and the neighborship between itself and the tested 
node. Thus, the tested node can not lie about its own position. 
This approach works against single attackers. When there 
are colluded malicious nodes, two attackers can claim false 
positions and neighborship to fool the server. 
The attack from colluded attackers can be mitigated if the 
polling message is sent on a hop-by-hop path and the reply to 
the polling message includes the authenticated routing vector 
from the server to the tested node. As in the mechanism used 
for securing the BGP routing protocol [4 I], each node en route 
signs its existence and verifies the neighborhood relationship 
with the next hop. The router vector and the positions of the 
nodes en route are piggyback to the polling message. The 
tested node sends the information back to the servers. We 
note that this method, although will protect against colluding 
attackers, requires tremendous public key process for route 
vector authentication. 
In this paper, we propose a mechanism to mitigate the 
interception attack that does not pay the cost of the above 
method, by randomly selecting another node to perform the 
polling. The chosen node receives the position that must be 
tested via a secure communication between the node and the 
position servers. As shown in Fig. 3, a polling message for 
testing a node at B is sent to a node at C first. The node at C 
then forwards the message toward B. The malicious node at 
A cannot intercept the message. A server normally resides in 
the overlapped area of a number of VHRs and serves several 
nodes. It is able to select the third party who is not close to 
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message is encrypted by the key shared between the third 
party and the servers. In this case; even though the tested 
node can intercept the polling message durins the message 
delivery from the server to the third party, it cannot obtain 
the random number used for authentication and carried in the 
tested message. For example, a malicious node may intercept 
all the polling messages if it is located very close to the server. 
However, because it does not know the key shared between 
the server and the third party, it cannot decrypt the message 
and obtain the nounce. 
3) Improving Verifi cation Accuracy: 
The proposed polling mechanism is able to catch a false 
position reporter if the position it reports is far away from 
its real position. However. a node can report a position with 
a relatively snlall error, such that when a polling message is 
sent to this reported position, the node can still receive it. As 
shown in [4411 a packet delivered to a position can be received 
by a node even half of the ad hoc radio transmission range 
away from that position. 
We propose several techniques that improve the accuracy 
of the position verification scheme. As a result, a server 
will catch a false position reporter even though the position 
error is not large. The proposed techniques are using smaller 
transmitting power for the polling message. multi-path verifi- 
cation, crossing-layer verification, node trajectory, as well as 
geographic profiles. 
a )  Adjrrstir?g Transmitri~~g Power: To catch a node that 
intentionally reports in-accurate position, a polling message 
is transmitted at a lower transmitting power. The lower the 
transmitting power is: the more precise the position verification 
is. The transmitting power is determined by the server, and a 
power indication is carried in the polling message: according 
to which nodes who forward the message will use the same 
power. In this paper: we refer to this scheme as fixed- 
transmission-power P o 2 v  scheme, or F - P o 2 v  scheme. 
The trade-off of using a smaller transmission range is 
that lowering the transmitting power may lead to a higher 
number of hops during the polling message delivery, which 
subsequently results in a larger conlmunication load. This 
load can be decreased if the polling message is sent to an 
intemlediate node using the normal transmitting power, and 
in the rest of the route the lower power is used. However, 
if the distance between the intermediate node and the tested 
node is large, many extra hops will be involved. 
To address the above problem, we propose another scheme, 
namely adaptive-transmission-range Po2V scheme, or A- 
Po2V .  The polling message is delivered using the nomial 
transmitting power level. An intermediate forwarder that re- 
ceives the polling message checks whether the tested position 
is within its transmission range according to the tested position 
and its own position, i.e.: whether it is the last hop. If 
not, it forwards the message further. Otherwise it adjusts its 
transmitting power and makes its transn~ission range barely 
cover the tested position. This last hop of the tested node 
then sends the polling message using the adjusted power. 
As the distance between the tested position and the last hop 
is normally smaller than the maximum ad hoc transmitting 
range, the position verification result is more accurate than 
the scheme using maximum power. 
b) Multi-Path Par-allel Pollirlg: To improve the position 
accuracy. more than one polling messages is sent to test a 
single position. The server selects the intermediate nodes at 
different positions: therefore the tested message is sent toward 
the tested position in different directions. Each testing message 
(polling message) carries a unique r7o~rnce. The position is 
verified only when the tested node shows that it has received 
all the nounces. The verification accuracy is improved at 
the price of communication overhead: because more polling 
messages have to be sent. 
c) Erlhancing Po2V with Advar7cecl Techrliques: A 
cross-layer design considering both network layer and physical 
layer mechanisms can provide powerful solutions for position 
security. For example, a position server may first authorize 
a mobile user that has a one-hop connection with the tested 
entity to process the verification. The mobile user uses the 
physical layer verification mechanism such as VM [15] to 
achieve better verification accuracy. 
Applying smart antenna in the multi-path verification 
scheme is another approach to further improve the verification 
accuracy. A server selects two intermediated nodes such that 
two polling messages are sent toward the tested position in 
different directions; as shown in fig. 4. The verification accu- 
racy depends on the width of the beam form. The approach 
will have an increased cost, because the cost on the physical 
layer increases. 
Last hop 2 
Last hop 1 
Fig. 4. The area where Ihe tested node can I-ecsivs both the tesling messages. 
It is possible that a malicious node sends a false position 
right after it has been polled. Since the probability that this 
node will be polled again is low, the false report may not 
be discovered. However, the false position can not be too far 
away from the real position, because the distance between 
this position and the position in the previous update, which is 
correct, should can not be greater than a threshold value used 
in distance-based position update. The time between the two 
updates cannot be too short, otherwise the tested node has an 
unreasonable moving speed. A joint use of node trajectory and 
geographic profiles can help to detect the false positions. For 
example, if the node's previous position is on one site of a 
wide river. it is less likely it is on the other side of the river 
at its next position update if there is no bridge nearby. 















































B. Mitigati~lg Bl~cklisti~zg Attacks 
In this subsection we propose niechanisins that mitigate the 
blacklisting attack. In particular, we focus on the attacks where 
malicious nodes intentionally drop or nianipulate the polling 
niessages. Our solution does not focus on addressing attacks 
caused by jamming. 
A simple solution to reduce the probability of blacklisting 
an honest user by interrupting the polling message delivery, 
is using multi-path delivery. A polling inessage is delivered 
through paths consisting of different intern~ediate forwarders. 
When the number of attackers in the network is small, it 
is less possible that there is an attacker in all of the paths 
so that all the polling messages are dropped. The server 
determines whether a node is honest based on statistics, i.e., 
the probabilities that a honest node responses to the polling 
when the network has different number of attackers. 
A more sophisticated solution is building a reputation 
system for the users of the position service. The trust and 
reputation system in ad hoc networks has been studied in [45], 
[46], where the reputation of an ad hoc node is built upon both 
the first-hand observation and the second-hand observation. 
For example: for the reputation value of a node A at another 
node B: the first-hand observation is the behavior of A that 
is detected directly by B, and the second-hand information 
is information obtained from any other nodes that have a 
reputation record for A. Such a system is complex because 
there is no trusted party. However. in our investigated scenario, 
all the position servers are trusted. This makes the reputation 
management less complex. 
A server sets an initial value for the reputation of a user. The 
value will decrease if the user fails to reply a polling message. 
If a tested node replies to the polling message successfully, 
its reputation will increase. Once the reputation for a user 
drops below a threshold value, the server gives it a warning 
or prevent it from using the position services. 
We denote y ( n )  as the accumulated reputation for a node 
whose position has been tested n times. After the (11  + 1 ) f h  
verification, denote the updated reputation value as y ( n +  1), if 
the tested node replies the server with the novnce successfully, 
Otherwise, 
~ ( n  + 1 )  = y ( n )  - f l  (2) 
The relationship between cy and /3 depends on the prob- 
ability of a routing failure. For exaniple, if the estimated 
probability for a routing failure in the network is p, to keep 
the reputation value of a legitimate user approximately as a 
constant, /3 = -a. 
P 
The reputation value can also be used to decide how 
frequent a server should test a node. If a node has a low 
reputation, the server will test this node more frequently and 
vice versa. 
A malicious node can take advantage of the reputation 
system with the help of colluding nodes. Suppose a ~nalicious 
node always drops the polling message for the legitimate users, 
yet it forwards the polling message destined for a malicious 
node. In this case the probability of a routing failure is different 
between legitimate users and attackers. As an attacker has 
a lower probability of routing failure, the reputation system 
parameter designed for legitimate users may help a malicious 
user get a high reputation and send false positions while 
keeping its reputation value high. However, our sin~ulation 
results show that such an attack can bring serious danlage 
only when the number of attackers in the network is large. In 
addition, in Po2V, it is difficult for a malicious forwarder to 
tell whether the tested node is an honest node or its colluding 
partner especially when the polling message is sent to the third 
party first, because only the tested position is carried in the 
plain text. 
C. Reducirig False Positives 
A false positive may occur if at the time the server sends 
a polling message toward the tested node, there is not route 
between them. To mediate this problem. when the server does 
not receive the testing nounce from the tested node, it polls 
a few more times using different paths. The server makes 
a decision only when the tested node fails to reply to a 
number of polling messages. A complementary technique is 
to have the forwarder that detects a routing failure send back 
the information to the server. However, this generates more 
network control overhead. When multi-path Po2V is used, it 
is likely that the tested node does not receive all the messages. 
To reduce the possibility that i t  is blacklisted, the tested node 
sends back the partial testing information i t  receives. 
Considering that a false positive is caused by node nlobility, 
the problem can be solved by assigning the testing message 
and other position-related control messages (e.g.: a position 
update message) with higher priority to access the wireless 
channel. When CSMAICA is used for channel access, a 
higher channel access priority is achieved by using smaller- 
size contention windows or even shorter Differentiated Inter 
Frame Space (DIFS). Even if the network is highly loaded with 
data traffic: the testing message can still be delivered to the 
vicinity of the tested position in a short time after it updates 
the position. 
To reduce the false positives caused by complicated radio 
propagation, a more sophisticated channel propagation model, 
such as the Walfisch-Ikegami model [47] developed for radio 
propagation in a metropolitan area, can be used. Fading and 
shadowing models should also be considered. In addition, 
geographic profiles such as the location of buildings ]nay also 
be used. 
In case the false positive is caused due to the routing 
failure for the polling reply, a mitigating mechanism is that 
once a tested node receives a polling message. it includes the 
nounce in a few of its following position updates. Another 
solution is that once a tested node receives a testing nounce. 
it updates its position immediately. As the time between the 
two transmissions is short. it is less unlikely that the route 
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In this section we analyze the accuracy of the proposed 
position verification scheme using two metrics. One metric 
is the probability that a lying node can be caught when the 
false position it reports is a certain distance away from its 
real position. The other metric is known as the perrurbarior~ 
atea. Perturbation area has been previously used to evaluate 
the location privacy in [48J1[49]. In P o 2 V ,  if a lying node 
stays in the perturbation area: it can still receive the testing 
message sent toward the false position. The larger this area 
is, the less accurate the testing algorithm can be. We use PDF 
function for the perturbation area to illustrate the verification 
accuracy. 
In our analysis, we denote ( r l .  7-2: d) as the curve when a 
circle with a radius of r2 is cut by a circle with a radius of r l ,  
while the distance between the centers of the circles is d. We 
denote SOcp( r l :  7-2. d )  as the overlapped area of two circular 
areas with radiuses of rl and 7-2. 
In this subsection we analyze the verification accuracy by 
calculating the probability that a false position reporter can be 
caught. 
I)  Verification with Fixed Transmitting Power: Figure 5 
(a) shows the case when fixed transmission range is used for 
polling message delivery, i.e.. in F - P o 2 V ,  and a lnalicious 
node reporting a false position is e away from its real position. 
We analyze the case when nodes are uniformly distributed 
and node density is high. The delivery path for a polling 
message from a server or a third party to the tested position 
is approximately a straight line. Since the last hop for the 
polling message delivery will broadcast the polling message, 
the malicious node can receive the polling message if the 
distance between its real position and the reported position 
is no more than the radio transmission range for the polling 
message. which is denoted as r .  In addition, if the malicious 
node is positioned no more than r away from the path for 
the polling message, it can also receive the message, even 
if e > r .  The area where a malicious position reporter can 
receive the message is the shaded area in Fig. 5 (a). When 
the real position is e away from the reported one, the false 
position reporter can receive the polling message only when 
it is located at the bold arch in the figure. 
Let z be the distance between the last hop and the tested 
position. The probability that an attacker can be caught for 
reporting a false position because it cannot receive the position 
verification message, denoted as p ( z :  e l ,  is: 
( r . e . z )  
p ( z ,  e )  = 2 % ~ .  e < JW. (3) 
a r c s ~ n ( r / e )  { otherwise. 
Given an error of e: the average probability that the inali- 
cious reporter can be caught, denoted as Pr-,,:,, is: 
f !c (x )  is the probability density function for z .  In this case 
.L- can be i~niformly distributed between 0 and r .  Although we 
cannot obtain an explicit function for Eqn. (4): Pr-,,,, can be 
calculated numerically. 
e: The position error 
r: Testing TI-ansmission range 
(a) Fixed transmission range 
e :  The position error 
r: Ad hoc Transmission range 
'p : Testin: range 
(b) Adaptive transmission range 
Fig. 5. Position verifi calion accuracy 
2) Verification with Adaptive Transmitting Power: 
Figure 5 (b) illustrates the case when adaptive transmission 
range is used to deliver the testing message. . i.e., in A- 
Po2V .  the scenarios that the malicious node can or cannot 
receive the testing message if its real position is e away from 
the reported position. The bold arch represents the positions 
where the attacker can still receive the testing message. r, is 
the transn~ission range used by the last hop for the tested node. 
When adapt~ve transmission range is used. the probability that 
a lier can be caught is a function of r ,  and e,  which can be 
denoted as p(r,. e ) .  p(rP.  e )  can be formulated as: 
2~ e l  e l .  
AT,. e )  = e 5 e l .  ( 5 )  
otherwise. 
el and e2 can be calculated in a straightforward way as  
follows: 
Denote the probability density function for r, as fTl, (r,). 
The average probability that a false position reporter can be 
, m
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A. Single-Path Verification
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caught: denoted as P ,-,, is: 
In this case f',,,(r,) can also be assumed to be a uniformly 
distributed function between 0 and r .  Pa-,,,, then can be 
calculated numerically. 
In the single-path verification scheme: the perturbation area 
is the shaded area in Fig. 5: which can be very large. 
B. Multi-Path Verificatior.1 
In this subsection we analyze the verification accuracy in the 
multi-path P o 2 V .  In particular, we calculate the probability 
that a false position reporter can be caught and the PDF of 
the perturbation area when tow polling messages are delivered 
to test the reported position. 
I) Verification with Fixed Transmitting Power: The 
probability that a false position reporter can be caught when 
two polling messages are sent, denoted as P , J ~ ,  is: 
where pcth can be obtained from Eqn. (3). 
We now analyze the perturbation area. A typical scenario 
when two testing messages are delivered to the tested node in 
different paths is described in Fig. 6. The first testing message 
is finally received by last hop 1 and last liop 1 forwards the 
message toward the tested node. Similarly, the second testing 
message is finally received by last liop 2 and last hop 2 
forwards the message toward the tested node. The perturbation 
area is the shaded area S. 
(a) Fixed transmission range 
(b) Adaptive transn~ission range 
Fig. 6 .  The area tllat a tested node can receive both rhe testing messages 
We denote the distance between Fl and D as d l ,  and the 
distance between F2 and D as d2.  We assume the server selects 
the third party randomly. Therefore, we can assume that dl  and 
d2 are randomly distributed between (0: r ) ,  and a is randomly 
distributed between (0: n). 
The distance between Fl and F2,  which is denoted as d, is 
formulated as: 
It is easy to derive the forn~ula for calculating the area S: 
which is: 
Based on Eqn. (10) and Eqn. (1 I), and distribution functions 
of d l ,  dl: and a, the distribution of S can be calculated. 
2 )  Verification with Adaptive Transmitting Power: The 
probability that a false position reporter can be caught when 
two polling messages are sent, denoted as Pn2? is: 
where pa,, can be obtained from Eqn. (5). 
When considering transmission range adaptation, the last 
hop 1 and 2 will adjust their transmitting power based on the 
positions of themselves and the position reported by the tested 
node. The transmission range is the distance between the last 
hops and the tested node. Similarly, the perturbation area S 
can be calculated in forms of d l ,  d2> and a. and therefore the 
correspondent PDF function can be obtained. 
C. A~ial)~sis Results 
Figure 7 depicts the analysis results for the probabilities 
that a node who intentionally sends a false position can be 
caught when a single testing message is sent. We evaluate 
both the scheme using fixed transmission ranges (F-Po2V) 
and the scheme with adaptive transmission range (A-Po21/). 
In F - P o ~ V ,  different transmission power values for the polling 
message are used and therefore, different transmission ranges 
for the polling message, RteSt,, are obtained. The probability 
that a node reporting a false position can be caught increases as 
either Rt,,, decreases or the position error, e, increases. In A- 
P o 2 V ,  the probability that a lier can be caught also increases 
as the error increases, but it increases slowly. The reason is that 
in A - P ~ ~ V ,  a node sending a false report with an error can 
still have the opportunity to intercept the message if it is close 
to the message delivery path, and for the last forwarder (i.e., 
the last hop), other forwarders use the maximum transmission 
range, which is 250m.. However. the adaptive scheme can 
catch a lier with a high probability (more than 0.5) even if 
the error is very small. As shown in Fig. 8, if two messages 
are sent on different paths, the verification accuracy can be 
greatly iinproved. 
Figure 9 shows the perti~rbation area in a multi-path P o 2 V  
schemes. For each verification, two polling messages are sent. 
The bold lines are the PDF values for A-Po2V.  It is observed 
, a-avg,
Pa-aug = 1p(Tp, e)Ir" (rp)drp. (8)
r"
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Posilion error (m) 
Fig. 7. Probability  hat a node sending false posi~ion can be caught when 
single polling rnessase is sent. 
d0 60 80 IW 12" 160 <w 2~ 2m 240 
Pastlion error (m) 
Fig. 8. Probability that a node sending false position c a ~ ~  be caught when 
two polling messages are sent. 
that for both perturbation area and perturbation strength, A- 
Po2\/ is comparable to the F-Po2V with the transmitting 
range for polling message set as 501n. and better than the 
F-Po2V with larger transmitting ranges. Especially, there is 
a high probability that the perturbation area for A-po2V is 
small. The perturbation area has a 50% chance to be snlaller 
than 2 x 103(m2).  
Penurballon area (m2) 
Fig 9. The size of the pe~turbation area. 
VI .  SIMULATION STUDY 
To further evaluate the accuracy for the position verification 
scheme. we use simulation to collect the probabilities that a 
false position reporter can not be caught as well as the proba- 
bility of false positives. The simulation scenario is a network 
with an area of 1500li1 x 1500m where nodes are unifol-mly 
distributed. Unless otherwise specified: the transmission range 
for the polling message is 250m. 
In Fig. 10, we show the simulation results for the probability 
of catching a false position reporter in the general case. The 
results for the single-path Po2\; are shown. It can be observed 
that when the transnlission range for the polling message. 
Rt,,,, is small, there is a great probability to catch a node 
who lies about its position even if this false position is very 
close to where this node actually is. Similarly. Fig. 1 I shows 
the improved capability of catching a false position reporter 
when multi-path Po2V is used. The verification results are 
close to those in the analysis. 
0 7 ~  
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Position error (m) 
Fig. 10. Probabilily of discovering a false posilion reporler under single-path 
F - I'021... 
I I 
0 60 80 rW IXi 110 
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Fig. I I .  Probability of discovering a false posirion repol.ter under multi-path 
F - I'021f. 
Figure 12 shows the simulation results when adaptive trans- 
mission range is used for polling messages. The results are 
similar to those in the analysis. A false reporter can be caught 
with a high probability even if its real position is close to 
the false position it claims. The multi-path scheme can further 
improve the verification accuracy. 
Figure 13 shows the probability that when the server at- 
tempts to poll a tested node for 71. times, i t  can not receive the 
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Fig. 12. Probability of discovering a false position reporter under . . ~ - P O ~ V .  Fig. 14. Probability of a failure lor thc tcsted node to receive the testing 
message whcn there are ~nalicious nodes in the ~ietwork. 
can also be viewed as the probability of a false positive if 
a server determines a node to be malicious when the tested 
node fails to reply to the polling message n times. The 
greedy geographic routing protocol is used for polling message 
delivery. When n increases. the probability decreases. When 
n = 3, this probability is small and can be ignored. Simulation 
results also show that the probability of a routing discovery 
failure decreases as the node density increases. This means 
that in a highly-densed network, the server can decide that a 
node is sending false positions after it fails to reply to a small 
number of polling messages. 
system is used, the reputation value of a legitimate position 
service user. The network has a node density of 100/k7n2 and 
the percentage for malicious node is 5% The initial reputation 
value is set as 1. According to the results in Fig. 14; the 
probability of a testing message delivery failure is 0.0985. 
Therefore, we select n value as 0.00197 and ,a value as 
0.01803 so that ,3/a = ( 1  - 0.0985)/0.0985. The simulation 
results show that for relatively long period, the reputation for 
a legitimate user will maintain close to the original value. 
0 0 8  : 
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Fig. 13. Probability of a failure for the tested node to recei\;e the testing 
message at different number of attempts. 
Figure 14 shows the probability of a false positive, i.e.? a 
tested node fails to receive the polling message when there 
are a percentage of p,,,,l malicious nodes in the network. We 
assume that when a malicious node is assigned to forward 
the polling message, it always drops it. The curve on the 
bottom is the probability of a delivery failure when there are 
no malicious nodes in the network. We observe that when 
the number of malicious nodes increases, the probability of 
a failure increases. We also observe that when node density 
is high enough, the failure is mainly caused by intentional 
dropping. If there are a large number of malicious nodes in the 
network, the probability of a testing message delivery failure 
will be high and the position service system may not work. 
Figure 15 shows the case when the proposed reputation 
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Fig. 15. Repulation for a legitimate user over a time period 
VII .  CONCLUSION A N D  FUTURE WORKS 
We propose P o 2 V ,  a lightweight, network layer position 
verification scheme in a distributed position service system 
designed for multi-hop mobile ad hoc networks. A server 
verifies whether a node has sent the correct position by 
sending a polling message toward the reported position using 
positioning routing. The verification accuracy improves when 
the transmitting power for the polling messages is reduced. 
To defend against interception attack, a triangle delivery is 
proposed. To mitigate the attacks on the polling message 
delivery and therefore the honest nodes can be blacklisted to be 
~nalicious: a reputation system is used so that a node is judged 
not based on its single behavior, but its behavior history. 
Different methods have been introduced to reduce the false 
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than traditional verification schemes, easy to be implement, 
and provides a verification accuracy that suffices for many 
applications. 
We will further study the robustness and accuracy for the 
verification scheme under colluding attacks. in a scenario 
where a large number of attackers are located around VHR. 
We will extend the scheme by adding the functionality that the 
servers within the one-hop of the tested node are used as the 
last hop for verification and combine i t  with a physical layer 
approach on the last hop to improve the verification accuracy 
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